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Abstract
In this work, we study position-based cryptography in the quantum setting. The aim is to
use the geographical position of a party as its only credential. On the negative side, we show
that if adversaries are allowed to share an arbitrarily large entangled quantum state, no secure
position-verification is possible at all. To this end, we prove the following very general result.
Assume that Alice and Bob hold respectively subsystems A and B of a (possibly) unknown
quantum state |ψ〉 ∈ HA ⊗ HB . Their goal is to calculate and share a new state |ϕ〉 = U |ψ〉,
where U is a fixed unitary operation. The question that we ask is how many rounds of mutual
communication are needed. It is easy to achieve such a task using two rounds of classical
communication, whereas in general, it is impossible with no communication at all.
Surprisingly, in case Alice and Bob share enough entanglement to start with and we allow
an arbitrarily small failure probability, we show that the same task can be done using a single
round of classical communication in which Alice and Bob simultaneously exchange two classical
messages. Actually, we prove that a relaxed version of the task can be done with no communi-
cation at all, where the task is to compute instead a state |ϕ′〉 that coincides with |ϕ〉 = U |ψ〉
up to local operations on A and on B, which are determined by classical information held by
Alice and Bob. The one-round scheme for the original task then follows as a simple corollary.
We also show that these results generalize to more players. As a consequence, we show a generic
attack that breaks any position-verification scheme.
On the positive side, we show that if adversaries do not share any entangled quantum
state but can compute arbitrary quantum operations, secure position-verification is achievable.
Jointly, these results suggest the interesting question whether secure position-verification is
possible in case of a bounded amount of entanglement. Our positive result can be interpreted
as resolving this question in the simplest case, where the bound is set to zero.
In models where secure positioning is achievable, it has a number of interesting applications.
For example, it enables secure communication over an insecure channel without having any
pre-shared key, with the guarantee that only a party at a specific location can learn the content
of the conversation. More generally, we show that in settings where secure position-verification
is achievable, other position-based cryptographic schemes are possible as well, such as secure
position-based authentication and position-based key agreement.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Background
The goal of position-based cryptography is to use the geographical position of a party as its only
“credential”. For example, one would like to send a message to a party at a geographical position pos
with the guarantee that the party can decrypt the message only if he or she is physically present
at pos. The general concept of position-based cryptography was introduced by Chandran, Goyal,
Moriarty and Ostrovsky [CGMO09]; certain specific related tasks have been considered before under
different names (see below and Section 1.3).
A central task in position-based cryptography is the problem of position-verification. We have
a prover P at position pos, wishing to convince a set of verifiers V0, . . . , Vk (at different points in
geographical space) that P is indeed at that position pos. The prover can run an interactive protocol
with the verifiers in order to convince them. The main technique for such a protocol is known as
distance bounding [BC94]. In this technique, a verifier sends a random nonce to P and measures
the time taken for P to reply back with this value. Assuming that the speed of communication is
bounded by the speed of light, this technique gives an upper bound on the distance of P from the
verifier.
The problem of secure positioning has been studied before in the field of wireless security,
and there have been several proposals for this task ([BC94, SSW03, VN04, Bus04, CH05, SP05,
ZLFW06, CCS06]). However, [CGMO09] shows that there exists no protocol for secure positioning
that offers security in the presence of multiple colluding adversaries. In other words, the set of
verifiers cannot distinguish between the case when they are interacting with an honest prover
at pos and the case when they are interacting with multiple colluding dishonest provers, none of
which is at position pos. Their impossibility result holds even if one makes computational hardness
assumptions, and it also rules out most other interesting position-based cryptographic tasks.
In light of the strong impossibility result, [CGMO09] considers a setting that assumes restric-
tions on the parties’ storage capabilities, called the Bounded-Retrieval Model (BRM) in the full
version of [CGMO09], and constructs secure protocols for position-verification and for position-
based key exchange (wherein the verifiers, in addition to verifying the position claim of a prover,
also exchange a secret key with the prover). While these protocols give us a way to realize position-
based cryptography, the underlying setting is relatively hard to justify in practice.
This leaves us with the question: are there any other assumptions or settings in which position-
based cryptography is realizable?
1.2 Our Approach and Our Results
In this work, we study position-based cryptography in the quantum setting. To start with, let
us briefly explain why moving to the quantum setting might be useful. The impossibility result
of [CGMO09] relies heavily on the fact that an adversary can locally store all information she
receives and at the same time share this information with other colluding adversaries, located
elsewhere. Recall that the positive result of [CGMO09] in the BRM circumvents the impossibility
result by assuming that an adversary cannot store all information he receives. By considering the
quantum setting, one may be able to circumvent the impossibility result thanks to the following
observation. If some information is encoded into a quantum state, then the above attack fails due to
the no-cloning principle: the adversary can either store the quantum state or send it to a colluding
adversary (or do something in-between, like store part of it), but not both.
However, this intuition turns out to be not completely accurate. Once the adversaries pre-share
entangled states, they can make use of quantum teleportation [BBC+93]. Although teleportation
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on its own does not appear to immediately conflict with the above intuition, we show that, based
on techniques by Vaidman [Vai03], adversaries holding a large amount of entangled quantum states
can perform instantaneous nonlocal quantum computation, which in particular implies that they
can compute any unitary operation on a state shared between them, using only local operations and
one round of classical mutual communication. Based on this technique, we show how a coalition of
adversaries can attack and break any position-verification scheme.
Interestingly, sharing entangled quantum systems is vital for attacking the position-verification
scheme. We show that there exist schemes that are secure in the information-theoretic sense, if
the adversary is not allowed to pre-share or maintain entanglement. Furthermore, we show how
to construct secure protocols for several position-based cryptographic tasks: position-verification,
authentication, and key exchange.
This leads to an interesting open question regarding the amount of pre-shared entanglement
required to break the positioning scheme: the case of a large amount of pre-shared states yields a
complete break of any scheme while having no pre-shared states leads to information-theoretically
secure schemes. The threshold of pre-shared quantum systems that keeps the system secure is yet
unknown.
1.3 Related Work
To the best of our knowledge, quantum schemes for position-verification have first been con-
sidered by Kent in 2002 under the name of “quantum tagging”. Together with Munro, Spiller
and Beausoleil, a patent for an (insecure) scheme was filed for HP Labs in 2004 and granted in
2006 [KMSB06]. Their results have not appeared in the academic literature until 2010 [KMS10]. In
that paper, they describe several basic schemes and describe how to break them using teleportation-
based attacks. They propose other variations (Schemes IV–VI in [KMS10]) not suspect to their
teleportation attack and leave their security as an open question. Our general attack shows that
these schemes are insecure as well.
Concurrent and independent of our work and the work on quantum tagging described above,
the approach of using quantum techniques for secure position-verification was proposed by Malaney
[Mal10a, Mal10b]. However, the proposed scheme is merely claimed secure, and no rigorous security
analysis is provided. As pointed out in [KMS10], Malaney’s schemes can also be broken by a
teleportation-based attack. Chandran et al. have proposed and proved secure a quantum scheme
for position-verification [CFG+10]. However, their proof implicitly assumed that the adversaries
have no pre-shared entanglement; as shown in [KMS10], their scheme also becomes insecure without
this assumption.
In a subsequent paper [LL11], Lau and Lo use similar ideas as in [KMS10] to show the insecurity
of position-verification schemes that are of a certain (yet rather restricted) form, which include the
schemes from [Mal10a, Mal10b] and [CFG+10]. Furthermore, they propose a position-verification
scheme that resists their attack, and they conjecture it secure. While these protocols might be
secure if the adversaries do not pre-share entanglement, our attack shows that all of them are
insecure in general.
In a recent note [Ken10], Kent considers a different model for position-based cryptography
where the prover’s position is not his only credential, but he is assumed to additionally share with
the verifiers a classical key unknown to the adversary. In this case, quantum key distribution can
be used to expand that key ad infinitum. This classical key stream is then used as authentication
resource.
The idea of performing “instantaneous measurements of nonlocal variables” has been put for-
ward by Vaidman [Vai03] and was further investigated by Clark et al. [CCJP10]. The concept of
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instantaneous nonlocal quantum computation presented here is an extension of Vaidman’s task.
After the appearance and circulation of our work, Beigi and Ko¨nig [BK11] used the technique
of port-based teleportation by Ishizaka and Hiroshima [IH08, IH09] to reduce the amount of en-
tanglement required to perform instantaneous nonlocal quantum computation (from our double
exponential) to exponential.
In [GLM02], Giovannetti et al. show how to measure the distance between two parties by
quantum cryptographic means so that only trusted people have access to the result. This is a
different kind of problem than what we consider, and the techniques used there are not applicable
in our setting.
1.4 Our Attack and Our Schemes in More Detail
Position-Verification - A Simple Approach. Let us briefly discuss the 1-dimensional case in
which we have two verifiers V0 and V1, and a prover P at position pos that lies on the straight line
between V0 and V1. Now, to verify P ’s position, V0 sends a BB84 qubit H
θ|x〉 to P , and V1 sends
the corresponding basis θ to P . The sending of these messages is timed in such a way that Hθ|x〉
and θ arrive at position pos at the same time. P has to measure the qubit in basis θ to obtain x,
and immediately send x to both V0 and V1, who verify the correctness of x and if it has arrived “in
time”.
The intuition for this scheme is the following. Consider a dishonest prover Pˆ0 between V0 and P ,
and a dishonest prover Pˆ1 between V1 and P . (It is not too hard to see that additional dishonest
provers do not help.) When Pˆ0 receives the BB84 qubit, she does not know yet the corresponding
basis θ. Thus, if she measures it immediately when she receives it, she is likely to measure it in
the wrong basis and Pˆ0 and Pˆ1 will not be able to provide the correct x. However, if she waits
until she knows the basis θ, Pˆ0 and Pˆ1 will be too late in sending x to V1 in time. Similarly, if she
forwards the BB84 qubit to Pˆ1, who receives θ before Pˆ0 does, then Pˆ0 and Pˆ1 will be too late in
sending x to V0. It seems that in order to break the scheme, Pˆ0 needs to store the qubit until she
receives the basis θ and at the same time send a copy of it to Pˆ1. But such actions are excluded
by the no-cloning principle.
The Attack and Instantaneous Nonlocal Quantum Computation. The above intuition
turns out to be wrong. Using pre-shared entanglement, Pˆ0 and Pˆ1 can perform quantum telepor-
tation which enables them (in some sense) to act coherently on the complete state immediately
upon reception. Combining this fact with the observation by Kent et al. [KMS10] that the Pauli-
corrections resulting from the teleportation commute with the actions of the honest prover in the
above protocol shows that colluding adversaries can perfectly break the protocol.
Much more generally, we will show how to break any position-verification scheme, possibly con-
sisting of multiple (and interleaved) rounds. To this end, we will show how to perform instantaneous
nonlocal quantum computation. In particular, we prove that any unitary operation U acting on a
composite system shared between players can be computed using only a single round of mutual
classical communication. Based on ideas by Vaidman [Vai03], the players teleport quantum states
back and forth many times in a clever way, without awaiting the classical measurement outcomes
from the other party’s teleportations.
Position-Verification in the No Pre-shared Entanglement (No-PE) Model. On the other
hand, the above intuition is correct in the no pre-shared entanglement (No-PE) model, where the
adversaries are not allowed to have pre-shared entangled quantum states prior the execution the
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protocol, or, more generally, prior the execution of each round of the protocol in case of multi-
round schemes. Even though this model may be somewhat unrealistic and artificial, analyzing
protocols in this setting serves as stepping stone to obtaining protocols which tolerate adversaries
who pre-share and maintain some limited amount of entanglement. But also, rigorously proving
security in the restrictive (for the adversary) No-PE model is already non-trivial and requires heavy
machinery. Our proof uses the strong complementary information trade-off (CIT) due to Renes and
Boileau [RB09], and it guarantees that for any strategy, the success probability of Pˆ0 and Pˆ1 is
bounded by approximately 0.89. By repeating the above simple scheme sequentially, we get a
secure multi-round positioning scheme with exponentially small soundness error. We note that
when performing sequential repetitions in the No-PE model, the adversaries must enter each round
with no entanglement; thus, they are not allowed to generate entanglement in one round, store it,
and use it in the next round(s).
Position-based authentication and key-exchange in the No-PE Model. Our position-
based authentication scheme is based on our position-verification scheme. The idea is to start with
a “weak” authentication scheme for a 1-bit message m: the verifiers and P execute the secure
position-verification scheme; if P wishes to authenticate m = 1, then P correctly finishes the
scheme by sending x back, but if P wishes to authenticate m = 0, P sends back an “erasure” ⊥
instead of the correct reply x with some probability q (which needs to be carefully chosen). This
authentication scheme is weak in the sense that turning 1 into 0 is easy for the adversary, but
turning a 0 into a 1 fails with constant probability.
The idea is to use a suitable balanced encoding of the actual message to be authenticated, so that
for any two messages, the adversary needs to turn many 0’s into 1’s. Unfortunately, an arbitrary
balanced encoding is not good enough. The reason is that we do not assume the verifiers and the
honest P to be synchronized. This asynchrony allows the adversary to make use of honest P who
is authenticating one index of the encoded message, in order to authenticate another index of the
modified encoded message towards the verifiers.
Nevertheless, we show that the above approach does work for carefully chosen codes. We show
that, for instance, the bit-wise encoding which maps 0 into 00...0 11...1 and 1 into 11...1 00...0 is
such a code.
Our solution borrows some ideas from [RW03, KR09, CKOR10] on authentication based on
weak secrets. However, since in our setting we cannot do liveness tests (to check that the verifier
is alive in the protocol), the techniques from [RW03, KR09, CKOR10] do not help us directly.
Given a position-based authentication scheme, one can immediately obtain a position-based key-
exchange scheme simply by (essentially) executing an arbitrary quantum-key-distribution scheme
(e.g. [BB84]), which assumes an authenticated classical communication channel, and authenticate
the classical communication by means of the position-based authentication scheme.
1.5 Organization of the paper
In Section 2, we begin by introducing notation, and presenting the relevant background from
quantum information theory. In Section 3, we describe the problem of position-verification and
define our standard quantum model, as well as the No-PE model in more detail. A protocol for
computing any unitary operation using local operations and one round of classical communication
is provided and analyzed in Section 4, and in Section 5 we conclude that there does not exist any
protocol for position-verification (and hence, any protocol for position-based cryptographic tasks)
in the standard quantum model. We present our position-verification protocol in the No-PE model
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in Section 6. Section 7 is devoted to our position-based authentication protocol and showing how
to combine the above tools to obtain position-based key exchange.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Notation and Terminology
We assume the reader to be familiar with the basic concepts of quantum information theory and
refer to [NC00] for an excellent introduction; we merely fix some notation.
Qubits. A qubit is a quantum system A with a 2-dimensional state space HA = C2. The compu-
tational basis {|0〉, |1〉} (for a qubit) is given by |0〉 = (10
)
and |1〉 = (01
)
, and the Hadamard basis
by H {|0〉, |1〉} = {H|0〉,H|1〉}, where H denotes the 2-dimensional Hadamard matrix, which maps
|0〉 to (|0〉+ |1〉)/√2 and |1〉 to (|0〉 − |1〉)/√2. The state space of an n-qubit system A = A1 · · ·An
is given by the 2n-dimensional space HA = (C2)⊗n = C2 ⊗ · · · ⊗ C2.
Since we mainly use the above two bases, we can simplify terminology and notation by identify-
ing the computational basis {|0〉, |1〉} with the bit 0 and the Hadamard basis H {|0〉, |1〉} with the
bit 1. Hence, when we say that an n-qubit state |ψ〉 ∈ (C2)⊗n is measured in basis θ ∈ {0, 1}n, we
mean that the state is measured qubit-wise where basis Hθi {|0〉, |1〉} is used for the i-th qubit. As
a result of the measurement, the string x ∈ {0, 1}n is observed with probability |〈ψ|Hθ|x〉|2, where
Hθ = Hθ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗Hθn and |x〉 = |x1〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |xn〉.
An important example of a 2-qubit state is the EPR pair, which is given by |ΦAB〉 = (|0〉|0〉 +
|1〉|1〉)/√2 ∈ HA ⊗ HB = C2 ⊗ C2 and has the following properties: if qubit A is measured in
the computational basis, a uniformly random bit x ∈ {0, 1} is observed and qubit B collapses to
|x〉. Similarly, if qubit A is measured in the Hadamard basis, a uniformly random bit x ∈ {0, 1} is
observed and qubit B collapses to H|x〉.
Density Matrices and Trace Distance. For any complex Hilbert space H, we write D(H)
for the set of all density matrices acting on H. We measure closeness of two density matrices ρ
and σ in D(H) by their trace distance: δ(ρ, σ) := 12tr|ρ − σ|. One can show that for any physical
processing of two quantum states described by ρ and σ, respectively, the two states behave in an
indistinguishable way except with probability at most δ(ρ, σ). Thus, informally, if δ(ρ, σ) is very
small, then without making a significant error, the two quantum states can be considered equal.
Classical and Hybrid Systems (and States). Subsystem X of a bipartite quantum sys-
tem XE is called classical, if the state of XE is given by a density matrix of the form ρXE =∑
x∈X PX(x)|x〉〈x| ⊗ ρxE , where X is a finite set of cardinality |X | = dim(HX), PX : X → [0, 1]
is a probability distribution, {|x〉}x∈X is some fixed orthonormal basis of HX , and ρxE is a den-
sity matrix on HE for every x ∈ X . Such a state, called hybrid state (also known as cq-state, for
classical and quantum), can equivalently be understood as consisting of a random variable X with
distribution PX and range X , and a system E that is in state ρxE exactly when X takes on the
value x. This formalism naturally extends to two (or more) classical systems X, Y etc. as well as
to two (or more) quantum systems.
Teleportation. The goal of teleportation is to transfer a quantum state from one location to
another by only communicating classical information. Teleportation requires pre-shared entangle-
ment among the two locations. Specifically, to teleport a qubit Q in an arbitrary (and typically
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unknown) state |ψ〉 from Alice to Bob, Alice performs a Bell-measurement on Q and her half of an
EPR-pair, yielding a classical measurement outcome k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}. Instantaneously, the other half
of the corresponding EPR pair, which is held by Bob, turns into the state σ†k|ψ〉, where σ0, σ1, σ2, σ3
denote the four Pauli-corrections {I,X,Z,XZ}, respectively, and σ† denotes the complex conjugate
of the transpose of σ. The classical information k is then communicated to Bob who can recover the
state |ψ〉 by performing σk on his EPR half. Note that the operator σk is Hermitian and unitary,
thus σ†k = σk and σkσ
†
k = I.
2.2 Some Quantum Information Theory
The von Neumann entropy of a quantum state ρ ∈ D(H) is given by H(ρ) := −tr(ρ log(ρ)), where
here and throughout the article, log denotes the binary logarithm. H(ρ) is non-negative and at most
log(dim(H)). For a bi-partite quantum state ρAB ∈ D(HA ⊗ HB), the conditional von Neumann
entropy of A given B is defined as H(ρAB |B) := H(ρAB) − H(ρB). In cases where the state ρAB
is clear from the context, we may write H(A|B) instead of H(ρAB |B). If X and Y are both
classical, H(X|Y ) coincides with the classical conditional Shannon entropy. Furthermore, in case
of conditioning (partly) on a classical state, the following holds.
Lemma 2.1. For any tri-partite state ρABY with classical Y : H(A|BY ) =
∑
y PY (y)H(ρ
y
AB |B).
Lemma 2.1 along with the concavity of H and Jensen’s inequality implies that for classical Y :
H(A) ≥ H(A|Y ) ≥ 0. The proof of Lemma 2.1 is given in Appendix A.
The following theorem is a generalization of the well-known Holevo bound [Hol73] (see also [NC00]),
and follows from the monotonicity of mutual information. Informally, it says that measuring only
reduces your information. Formally, and tailored to the notation used here, it ensures the following.
Theorem 2.2. Let ρAB ∈ D(HA⊗HB) be an arbitrary bi-partite state, and let ρAY be obtained by
measuring B in some basis to observe (classical) Y . Then H(A|Y ) ≥ H(A|B).
For classical X and Y , the Fano inequality [Fan61] (see also [CT91]) allows to bound the
probability of correctly guessingX when having access to Y . In the statement below and throughout
the article, h : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] denotes the binary entropy function defined as h(p) = −p log(p)− (1−
p) log(1 − p) for 0 < p < 1 and as h(p) = 0 for p = 0 or 1, and h−1 : [0, 1] → [0, 12 ] denotes its
inverse on the branch 0 ≤ p ≤ 12 .
Theorem 2.3 (Fano inequality). Let X and Y be random variables with ranges X and Y, respec-
tively, and let Xˆ be a guess for X computed solely from Y . Then q := P [Xˆ 6=X] satisfies
h(q) + q log(|X | − 1) ≥ H(X|Y ) .
In particular, for binary X: q ≥ h−1(H(X|Y )).
2.3 Strong Complementary Information Tradeoff
The following entropic uncertainty principle, called strong complementary information tradeoff
(CIT) in [RB09] and generalized in [BCC+10], is at the heart of our security proofs. It relates
the uncertainty of the measurement outcome of a system A with the uncertainty of the measure-
ment outcome when the complementary basis is used instead, and it guarantees that there can
coexist at most one system E that has full information on both possible outcomes. Note that
by the complementary basis θ¯ of a basis θ = (θ1, . . . , θn) ∈ {0, 1}n, we mean the n-bit string
θ¯ = (θ¯1, . . . , θ¯n) ∈ {0, 1}n with θ¯i 6= θi for all i.
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Theorem 2.4 (CIT). Let |ψAEF 〉 ∈ HA ⊗HE ⊗HF be an arbitrary tri-partite state, where HA =
(C2)⊗n. Let the hybrid state ρXEF be obtained by measuring A in basis θ ∈ {0, 1}n, and let the
hybrid state σXEF be obtained by measuring A (of the original state |ψAEF 〉) in the complementary
basis θ¯. Then
H(ρXE |E) + H(σXF |F ) ≥ n .
CIT in particular implies the following (the proof is given in Appendix A):
Corollary 2.5. Let |ψAEF 〉 ∈ HA⊗HE⊗HF be an arbitrary tri-partite state, where HA = (C2)⊗n.
Let Θ be uniformly distributed in {0, 1}n and let X be the result of measuring A in basis Θ. Then
H(X|ΘE) + H(X|ΘF ) ≥ n .
3 Setup and The Task of Position Verification
3.1 The Security Model
We informally describe the model we use for the upcoming sections, which is a quantum version of
the Vanilla (standard) model introduced in [CGMO09] (see there for a full description). We also
describe our restricted model used for our security proof, that we call the no pre-shared entanglement
(No-PE) model. We consider entities V0, . . . , Vk called verifiers and an entity P , the (honest) prover.
Additionally, we consider a coalition Pˆ of dishonest provers (or adversaries) Pˆ0, . . . , Pˆℓ. All entities
can perform arbitrary quantum (and classical) operations and can communicate quantum (and
classical) messages among them.
For our positive results, we consider a restricted model, which prohibits entanglement between
the dishonest verifiers. Specifically, the No-PE model is such that the dishonest provers enter every
new round of communication, initiated by the verifiers, with no pre-shared entanglement. That is,
in every round, a dishonest prover can send an entangled quantum state only after it receives the
verifier’s message, and the dishonest provers cannot maintain such an entangled state in order to
use it in the next round. As mentioned in the introduction, considering this simple (but possibly
unrealistic) model may help us in obtaining protocols that are secure against adversaries with
limited entanglement.
For simplicity, we assume that quantum operations and communication are noise-free; however,
our results generalize to the more realistic noisy case, assuming that the noise is low enough. We
require that the verifiers have a private and authenticated channel among themselves, which allows
them to coordinate their actions by communicating before, during or after protocol execution. We
stress however, that this assumption does not hold for the communication between the verifiers
and P : Pˆ has full control over the destination of messages communicated between the verifiers
and P (both ways). In particular, the verifiers do not know per-se if they are communicating with
the honest or a dishonest prover (or a coalition of dishonest provers).
The above model is extended by incorporating the notion of time and space. Each entity
is assigned an arbitrary fixed position pos in the d-dimensional space Rd, and we assume that
messages to be communicated travel at fixed velocity v (e.g. with the speed of light), and hence
the time needed for a message to travel from one entity to another equals the Euclidean distance
between the two (assuming that v is normalized to 1). This timing assumption holds for honest
and dishonest entities. We assume on the other hand that local computations take no time.
Finally, we assume that the verifiers have precise and synchronized clocks, so that they can
coordinate exact times for sending off messages and can measure the exact time of a message
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arrival. We do not require P ’s clock to be precise or in sync with the verifiers. However, we do
assume that P cannot be reset.
This model allows to reason as follows. Consider a verifier V0 at position pos0, who sends a
challenge ch0 to the (supposedly honest) prover claiming to be at position pos. If V0 receives a
reply within time 2d(pos0, pos), where d(·, ·) is the Euclidean distance measure in Rd and thus also
measures the time a message takes from one point to the other, then V0 can conclude that he is
communicating with a prover that is within distance d(pos0, pos).
We stress that in our model, the honest prover P has no advantage over the dishonest provers
beyond being at its position pos. In particular, P does not share any secret information with the
verifiers, nor can he per-se authenticate his messages by any other means.
Throughout the article, we require that the honest prover P is enclosed by the verifiers V0, . . . , Vk
in that the prover’s position pos ∈ Rd lies within the tetrahedron, i.e., convex hull, Hull(pos0, . . . , posk) ⊂
R
d formed by the respective positions of the verifiers. Note that in this work we consider only stand-
alone security, i.e., there exists only a single execution with a single honest prover, and we do not
guarantee concurrent security.
3.2 Secure Position Verification
A position-verification scheme should allow a prover P at position pos ∈ Rd (in d-dimensional space)
to convince a set of k+1 verifiers V0, . . . , Vk, who are located at respective positions pos0, . . . , posk ∈
R
d, that he is indeed at position pos. We assume that P is enclosed by V0, . . . , Vk. We require
that the verifiers jointly accept if an honest prover P is at position pos, and we require that the
verifiers reject with “high” probability in case of a dishonest prover that is not at position pos.
The latter should hold even if the dishonest prover consist of a coalition of collaborating dishonest
provers Pˆ0, . . . , Pˆℓ at arbitrary positions apos0, . . . , aposℓ ∈ Rd with aposi 6= pos for all i. We
refer to [CGMO09] for the general formal definition of the completeness and security of a position-
verification scheme. In this article, we mainly focus on position-verification schemes of the following
form:
Definition 3.1. A 1-round position-verification scheme PV = (Chlg,Resp,Ver) consists of the
following three parts. A challenge generator Chlg, which outputs a list of challenges (ch0, . . . , chk)
and auxiliary information x; a response algorithm Resp, which on input a list of challenges outputs
a list of responses (x′0, . . . , x
′
k); and a verification algorithm Ver with Ver(x
′
0, . . . , x
′
k, x) ∈ {0, 1}.
PV is said to have perfect completeness if Ver(x′0, . . . , x
′
k, x) = 1 with probability 1 for
(ch0, . . . , chk) and x generated by Chlg and (x
′
0, . . . , x
′
k) by Resp on input (ch0, . . . , chk).
The algorithms Chlg, Resp and Ver are used as described in Figure 1 to verify the claimed
position of a prover P . We clarify that in order to have all the challenges arrive at P ’s (claimed)
location pos at the same time, the verifiers agree on a time T and each Vi sends off his challenge
chi at time T − d(posi, pos). As a result, all chi’s arrive at P ’s position pos at time T . In Step 3, Vi
receives x′i in time if x
′
i arrives at Vi’s position posi at time T +d(posi, pos). Throughout the article,
we use this simplified terminology. Furthermore, we are sometimes a bit sloppy in distinguishing a
party, like P , from its location pos.
We stress that we allow Chlg, Resp and Ver to be quantum algorithms and chi, x and x
′
i to be
quantum information. In our constructions, only ch0 will actually be quantum; thus, we will only
require quantum communication from V0 to P , all other communication is classical. Also, in our
constructions, x′0 = . . . = x
′
k, and Ver(x
′
0, . . . , x
′
k, x) = 1 exactly if x
′
i = x for all i.
Definition 3.2. A 1-round position-verification scheme PV = (Chlg,Resp,Ver) is called ε-sound
if for any position pos ∈ Hull(pos0, . . . , posk), and any coalition of dishonest provers Pˆ0, . . . , Pˆℓ
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Common input to the verifiers: their respective positions pos0, . . . , posk, and P ’s (claimed) position pos.
0. V0 generates a list of challenges (ch0, . . . , chk) and auxiliary information x using Chlg, and sends
chi to Vi for i = 1, . . . , k.
1. Every Vi sends chi to P in such a way that all chi’s arrive at the same time at P ’s position pos.
2. P computes (x′0, . . . , x
′
k) := Resp(ch0, . . . , chk) as soon as all the chi’s arrive, and he sends x
′
i to
Vi for every i.
3. The Vi’s jointly accept if and only if all Vi’s receive x
′
i in time and Ver(x
′
0, . . . , x
′
k, x) = 1.
Figure 1: Generic 1-round position-verification scheme.
at arbitrary positions apos0, . . . , aposℓ, all 6= pos, when executing the scheme from Figure 1 the
verifiers accept with probability at most ε. We write PVε for such a protocol.
In order to be more realistic, we must take into consideration physical limitations of the equip-
ment used, such as measurement errors, computation durations, etc. Those allow a dishonest prover
which resides arbitrarily close to P to appear as if she resides at pos. Thus, we assume that all the
adversaries are at least ∆-distanced from pos, where ∆ is determined by those imperfections. For
sake of simplicity, this ∆ is implicit in the continuation of the paper.
A position-verification scheme can also be understood as a (position-based) identification scheme,
where the identification is not done by means of a cryptographic key or a password, but by means
of the geographical location.
4 Instantaneous Nonlocal Quantum Computation
In order to analyze the (in)security of position-verification schemes, we first address a more general
task, which is interesting in its own right: instantaneous nonlocal quantum computation1. Consider
the following problem, involving two parties Alice and Bob. Alice holds A and Bob holds B
of a tripartite system ABE that is in some unknown state |ψ〉. The goal is to apply a known
unitary transformation U to AB, but without using any communication, just by local operations.
In general, such a task is clearly impossible, as it violates the non-signalling principle. The goal of
instantaneous nonlocal quantum computation is to achieve almost the above but without violating
non-signalling. Specifically, the goal is for Alice and Bob to compute, without communication,
a state |ϕ′〉 that coincides with |ϕ〉 = (U ⊗ I)|ψ〉 up to local and qubit-wise operations on A
and B, where I denotes the identity on E. Furthermore, these local and qubit-wise operations
are determined by classical information that Alice and Bob obtain as part of their actions. In
particular, if Alice and Bob share their classical information, which can be done with one round of
simultaneous mutual communication, then they can transform |ϕ′〉 into |ϕ〉 = U |ψ〉 by local qubit-
wise operations. Following ideas by Vaidman [Vai03], we show below that instantaneous nonlocal
quantum computation, as described above, is possible if Alice and Bob share sufficiently many EPR
pairs.
In the following, let HA, HB and HE be Hilbert spaces where the former two consist of nA and
nB qubits respectively, i.e., HA = (C2)⊗nA and HB = (C2)⊗nB . Furthermore, let U be a unitary
1This is an extension of the task of “instantaneous measurement of nonlocal variables” introduced by Vaid-
man [Vai03].
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matrix acting on HA ⊗ HB. Alice holds system A and Bob holds system B of an arbitrary and
unknown state |ψ〉 ∈ HABE = HA⊗HB ⊗HE. Additionally, Alice and Bob share an arbitrary but
finite number of EPR pairs.
Theorem 4.1. For every unitary U and for every ε > 0, given sufficiently many shared EPR pairs,
there exist local operations A and B, acting on Alice’s and Bob’s respective sides, with the following
property. For any initial state |ψ〉 ∈ HABE, the joint execution A ⊗ B transforms |ψ〉 into |ϕ′〉
and provides classical outputs k to Alice and ℓ to Bob, such that the following holds except with
probability ε. The state |ϕ′〉 coincides with |ϕ〉 = (U ⊗ I)|ψ〉 up to local qubit-wise operations on
A and B that are determined by k and ℓ.
We stress that A acts on A as well as on Alice’s shares of the EPR pairs, and the corresponding
holds for B. Furthermore, being equal up to local qubit-wise operations on A and B means that
|ϕ〉 = (V Ak,ℓ ⊗ V Bk,ℓ ⊗ I)|ϕ′〉, where {V Ak,ℓ}k,ℓ and {V Bk,ℓ}k,ℓ are fixed families of unitaries which act
qubit-wise on HA and HB, respectively. In our construction, the V Ak,ℓ and V Bk,ℓ’s will actually be
tensor products of one-qubit Pauli operators.
As an immediate consequence of Theorem 4.1, we get the following.
Corollary 4.2. For every unitary U and for every ε > 0, given sufficiently many shared EPR pairs,
there exists a nonlocal operation AB for Alice and Bob which consists of local operations and one
round of mutual communication, such that for any initial state |ψ〉 ∈ HABE of the tripartite system
ABE, the joint execution of AB transforms |ψ〉 into |ϕ〉 = (U ⊗ I)|ψ〉, except with probability ε.
For technical reasons, we will actually prove the following extension of Theorem 4.1, which is
easily seen equivalent. The difference to Theorem 4.1 is that Alice and Bob are additionally given
classical inputs: x to Alice and y to Bob, and the unitary U that is to be applied to the quantum
input depends on x and y. In the statement below, x ranges over some arbitrary but fixed finite
set X , and y ranges over some arbitrary but fixed finite set Y.
Theorem 4.3. For every family {Ux,y} of unitaries and for every ε > 0, given sufficiently many
shared EPR pairs, there exist families {Ax} and {By} of local operations, acting on Alice’s and
Bob’s respective sides, with the following property. For any initial state |ψ〉 ∈ HABE and for every
x ∈ X and y ∈ Y, the joint execution Ax ⊗ By transforms the state |ψ〉 into |ϕ′〉 and provides
classical outputs k to Alice and ℓ to Bob, such that the following holds except with probability ε.
The state |ϕ′〉 coincides with |ϕ〉 = (Ux,y ⊗ I)|ψ〉 up to local qubit-wise operations on A and B that
are determined by k and ℓ.
The solution works by teleporting states back and forth in a clever way [Vai03], but without
communicating the classical outcomes of the Bell measurements, so that only local operations are
performed. Thus, in the formal proof below, whenever we say that a state is teleported, it should
be understood in this sense, i.e., the sender makes a Bell measurement resulting in some classical
information, and the receiver takes his shares of the EPR pairs as the received state, but does/can
not (yet) correct it.
Proof. To simplify notation, we assume that the joint state of A and B is pure, and thus we may
ignore system E. However, all our arguments also hold in case the state of A and B is entangled
with E.
Next, we observe that it is sufficient to prove Theorem 4.3 for the case where B is “empty”, i.e.,
dimHB = 1 and thus nB = 0. Indeed, if this is not the case, Alice and Bob can do the following.
Bob first teleports B to Alice. Now, Alice holds A′ = AB with nA′ = nA + nB, and Bob’s system
11
has collapsed and thus Bob holds no quantum state anymore, only classical information. Then,
they do the nonlocal computation, and in the end Alice teleports B back to Bob. The modification
to the state of B introduced by teleporting it to Alice can be taken care of by modifying the set
of unitaries {Ux,y} accordingly (and making it dependent on Bob’s measurement outcome, thereby
extending the set Y). Also, the modification to the state of B introduced by teleporting it back
to Bob does not harm the requirement of the joint state being equal to |ϕ〉 = Ux,y|ψ〉 up to local
qubit-wise operations.
Hence, from now on, we may assume that B is “empty”, and we write n for nA. Next, we
describe the core of how the local operations Ax and By work. To simplify notation, we assume
that X = {1, . . . ,m}. Recall that Alice and Bob share (many) EPR pairs. We may assume that
the EPR pairs are grouped into groups of size n; each such group we call a teleportation channel.
Furthermore, we may assume that m of these teleportation channels are labeled by the numbers 1
up to m, and that another m of these teleportation channels are labeled by the numbers m+ 1 up
to 2m.
1. Alice teleports |ψ〉 to Bob, using the teleportation channel that is labeled by her input x. Let
us denote her measurement outcome by k◦ ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}n.
2. For every i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, Bob does the following. He applies the unitary Ui,y to the n qubits
that make up his share of the EPR pairs given by the teleportation channel labeled by i.
Then, he teleports the resulting state to Alice using the teleportation channel labeled by
m+ i. We denote the corresponding measurement outcome by ℓ◦,i.
3. Alice specifies the n qubits that make up her share of the EPR pairs given by the teleportation
channel labeled by m+ x to be the state |ϕ′〉.
Let us analyze the above. With probability 1/4n, namely if k◦ = 0 · · · 0, teleporting |ψ〉 to Bob
leaves the state unchanged. In this case, it is easy to see that the resulting state |ϕ′〉 satisfies the
required property of being identical to |ϕ〉 = Ux,y|ψ〉 up to local qubit-wise operations determined
by ℓ◦,x, and thus determined by x and ℓ◦ = (ℓ◦,1, . . . , ℓ◦,m). This proves the claim for the case
where ε ≥ 1− 1/4n.
We show how to reduce ε. The crucial observation is that if in the above procedure k◦ 6= 0 · · · 0,
and thus |ϕ′〉 is not necessarily identical to |ϕ〉 up to local qubit-wise operations, then
|ϕ′〉 = Vℓ◦,xUx,yVk◦|ψ〉 = Vℓ◦,xUx,yVk◦U †x,y|ϕ〉 ,
where Vℓ◦,x and Vk◦ are tensor products of Pauli matrices. Thus, setting |ψ′〉 := |ϕ′〉, x′ := (x, k◦)
and y′ := (y, ℓ◦), and U
′
x′,y′ := Ux,yVk◦U
†
x,yVℓ◦,x , the state |ϕ〉 can be written as |ϕ〉 = U ′x′,y′ |ψ′〉.
This means, we are back to the original problem of applying a unitary, U ′x′,y′ , to a state, |ψ′〉, held
by Alice, where the unitary depends on classical information x′ and y′, known by Alice and Bob,
respectively. Thus, we can re-apply the above procedure to the new problem instance. Note that
in the new problem instance, the classical inputs x′ and y′ come from larger sets than the original
inputs x and y, but the new quantum input, |ψ′〉, has the same qubit size, n. Therefore, re-applying
the procedure will succeed with the same probability 1/4n.
As there is a constant probability of success in each round, re-applying the above procedure
sufficiently many times to the resulting new problem instances guarantees that except with arbitrary
small probability, the state |ϕ′〉 will be of the required form at some point (when Alice gets k◦ =
0 · · · 0). Say, this is the case at the end of the j-th iteration. Then, Alice stops with her part of the
procedure at this point, keeps the state |ϕ′〉, and specifies k to consist of j and of her classical input
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into the j-th iteration (which consists of x and of the k◦’s from the prior j − 1 iterations). Since
Bob does not learn whether an iteration is successful or not, he has to keep on re-iterating up to
some bound, and in the end he specifies ℓ to consist of the ℓ◦’s collected over all the iterations. The
state |ϕ′〉 equals |ϕ〉 = Ux,y|ψ〉 up to local qubit-wise operations that are determined by k and ℓ.
Doing the maths shows that the number of EPR pairs needed by Alice and Bob in the scheme
described in the proof is double exponential in nA+nB, the qubit size of the joint quantum system.
In recent subsequent work [BK11], Beigi and Ko¨nig have used a different kind of quantum
teleportation by Ishizaka and Hiroshima [IH08, IH09] to reduce the amount of entanglement needed
to to perform instantaneous nonlocal quantum computation to exponential in the qubit size of the
joint quantum system. It remains an interesting open question whether such an exponentially large
amount of entanglement is necessary.
In Appendix B, we explain how to perform instantaneous nonlocal quantum computation among
more than two parties.
5 Impossibility of Unconditional Position Verification
In this section we show that no position-verification scheme is secure against a coalition of quantum
adversaries in the Vanilla model. For simplicity, we consider the one-dimensional case, with two
verifiers V0 and V1, but the attack can be generalized to higher dimensions and more verifiers.
We consider an arbitrary position-verification scheme in our model (as specified in Section 3.1).
We recall that in this model, the verifiers must base their decision solely on what the prover replies
and how long it takes him to reply, and the honest prover has no advantage over a coalition of
dishonest provers beyond being at the claimed position2. Such a position-verification scheme may
be of the form as specified in Figure 1, but may also be made up of several, possibly interleaved,
rounds of interaction between the prover and the verifiers.
For the honest prover P , such a general scheme consists of steps that look as follows. P holds
a local quantum register R, which is set to some default value at the beginning of the scheme. In
each step, P obtains a system A from V0 and a system B from V1, and V0 and V1 jointly keep some
system E. Let |ψ〉 be the state of the four-partite system ABRE; it is determined by the scheme
and by the step within the scheme we are focussing on. P has to apply a fixed3 known unitary
transformation U to ABR, and send the (transformed) systems A and B back to V0 and V1 (and
keep R). Note that after the transformation, the state of ABRE is given by |ϕ〉 = (U ⊗ I)|ψ〉,
where I is the identity acting on HE . For technical reasons, as in Section 4, it will be convenient
to distinguish between classical and quantum inputs, and therefore, we let the unitary U depend
on classical information x and y, where x has been sent by V0 along with A, and y has been sent
by V1 along with B.
We show that a coalition of two dishonest provers Pˆ0 and Pˆ1, where Pˆ0 is located in between
V0 and P and Pˆ1 is located in between V1 and P , can perfectly simulate the actions of the honest
prover P , and therefore it is impossible for the verifiers to distinguish between an honest prover
at position pos and a coalition of dishonest provers at positions different from pos. The simulation
of the dishonest provers perfectly imitates the computation as well as the timing of an honest P .
Since in our model this information is what the verifiers have to base their decision on, the general
impossibility of position-verification in our model follows.
2In particular, the prover does not share any secret information with the verifiers, differentiating our setting from
models as described for example in [Ken10].
3
U is fixed for a fixed scheme and for a fixed step within the scheme, but of course may vary for different schemes
and for different steps within a scheme.
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Consider a step in the scheme as described above, but now from the point of view of Pˆ0 and Pˆ1.
Since Pˆ0 is closer to V0, he will first receive A and x; similarly, Pˆ1 will first receive B and y. We
specify that Pˆ1 takes care of and maintains the local register R. If the step we consider is the first
step in the scheme, the state of ABRE equals |ψ〉, as in the case of an honest P . In order to have
an invariant that holds for all the steps, we actually relax this statement and merely observe that
the state of ABRE, say |ψ′〉, equals |ψ〉 up to local and qubit-wise operations on the subsystem R,
determined by classical information x◦ and y◦, where Pˆ0 holds x◦ and Pˆ1 holds y◦. This invariant
clearly holds for the first step in the scheme, when R is in some default state, and we will show
that it also holds for the other steps.
By Theorem 4.3, it follows that without communication, just by instantaneous local operations,
Pˆ0 and Pˆ1 can transform the state |ψ′〉 into a state |ϕ′〉 that coincides with |ϕ〉 = (Ux,y ⊗ I)|ψ〉
up to local and qubit-wise transformations on A, B and R, determined by classical information k
(known to Pˆ0) and ℓ (known to Pˆ1). Note that the initial state is not |ψ〉, but rather a state of the
form |ψ′〉 = (Vx◦,y◦ ⊗ I)|ψ〉, where x◦ is known to Pˆ0 and y◦ to Pˆ1. Thus, Theorem 4.3 is actually
applied to the unitary U ′x′,y′ = Ux,yV
†
x◦,y◦ , where x
′ = (x◦, x) and y
′ = (y◦, y). Given |ϕ′〉 and k and
ℓ, Pˆ0 and Pˆ1 can exchange k and ℓ using one mutual round of communication and transform |ϕ′〉
into |ϕ′′〉 that coincides with |ϕ〉 up to qubit-wise operations only on R, and send A to V0 and B
to V1. It follows that the state of ABE and the time it took Pˆ0 and Pˆ1 for the computation and
communication is identical to that of an honest P , i.e., Pˆ0 and Pˆ1 have perfectly simulated this
step of the scheme.
Finally, we see that the invariant is satisfied, when moving on to the next step in the scheme,
where Pˆ0 and Pˆ1 receive newA andB (along with new classical x and y) from V0 and V1, respectively.
Even if this new round interleaves with the previous round in that the new A and B etc. arrive
before Pˆ0 and Pˆ1 have finished exchanging (the old) k and ℓ, it still holds that the state of ABRE
is as in the case of honest P up to qubit-wise operations on the subsystem R. It follows that the
above procedure works for all the steps and thus that Pˆ0 and Pˆ1 can indeed perfectly simulate
honest P ’s actions throughout the whole scheme.
6 Secure Position-Verification in the No-PE model
6.1 Basic Scheme and its Analysis
In this section we show the possibility of secure position-verification in the No-PE model. We
consider the following basic 1-round position-verification scheme, given in Figure 2. It is based on
the BB84 encoding.
0. V0 chooses two random bits x, θ ∈ {0, 1} and privately sends them to V1.
1. V0 prepares the qubit H
θ|x〉 and sends it to P , and V1 sends the bit θ to P , so that Hθ|x〉 and θ
arrive at the same time at P .
2. When Hθ|x〉 and θ arrive, P measures Hθ|x〉 in basis θ to observe x′ ∈ {0, 1}, and sends x′ to V0
and V1.
3. V0 and V1 accept if on both sides x
′ arrives in time and x′ = x.
Figure 2: Position-verification scheme PVεBB84 based on the BB84 encoding.
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We implicitly specify that parties abort if they receive any message that is inconsistent with
the protocol, for instance (classical) messages with a wrong length, or different number of received
qubits than expected, etc.
Theorem 6.1. The 1-round position-verification scheme PVεBB84 from Figure 2 is ε-sound with
ε = 1− h−1(12 ), in the No-PE model.
Recall that h denotes the binary entropy function and h−1 its inverse on the branch 0 ≤ p ≤ 12 .
A numerical calculation shows that h−1(12) ≥ 0.11 and thus ε ≤ 0.89. A particular attack for a
dishonest prover Pˆ , sitting in-between V0 and P , is to measure the qubit H
θ|x〉 in the Breidbart
basis, resulting in an acceptance probability of cos(π/8)2 ≈ 0.85. This shows that our analysis is
pretty tight.
Proof. In order to analyze the position-verification scheme it is convenient to consider an equivalent
purified version, given in Figure 3. The only difference between the original and the purified scheme
is the preparation of the bit Hθ|x〉. In the purified version, it is done by preparing |ΦAB〉 =
(|0〉|0〉+ |1〉|1〉)/√2 and measuring A in basis θ. This way of preparation changes the point in time
when V0 measures A, and the point in time when V1 learns x. This, however, has no influence
on the view of the (dishonest or honest) prover, nor on the joint distribution of θ, x and x′, and
thus neither on the probability that V0 and V1 accept. It therefore suffices to analyze the purified
version.
0. V0 and V1 privately agree on a random bit θ ∈ {0, 1}.
1. V0 prepares an EPR pair |ΦAB〉 ∈ HA ⊗HB, keeps qubit A and sends B to P , and V1 sends the
bit θ to P , so that B and θ arrive at the same time at P .
2. When B and θ arrive, P measures B in basis θ to observe x′ ∈ {0, 1}, and sends x′ to V0 and V1.
3. Only now, when x′ arrives, V0 measures A in basis θ to observe x, and privately sends x to V1.
V0 and V1 accept if on both sides x
′ arrives in time and x′ = x.
Figure 3: EPR version of PVεBB84.
We first consider security against two dishonest provers Pˆ0 and Pˆ1, where Pˆ0 is between V0 and
P and Pˆ1 is between V1 and P . In the end we will argue that a similar argument holds for multiple
dishonest provers on either side.
Since V0 and V1 do not accept if x
′ does not arrive in time and dishonest provers do not use
pre-shared entanglement in the No-PE-model, any potentially successful strategy of Pˆ0 and Pˆ1 must
look as follows. As soon as Pˆ1 receives the bit θ from V1, she forwards (a copy of) it to Pˆ0. Also,
as soon as Pˆ0 receives the qubit A, she applies an arbitrary quantum operation to the received
qubit A (and maybe some ancillary system she possesses) that maps it into a bipartite state E0E1
(with arbitrary state space HE0 ⊗HE1), and Pˆ0 keeps E0 and sends E1 to Pˆ1. Then, as soon as Pˆ0
receives θ, she applies some measurement (which may depend on θ) to E0 to obtain xˆ0, and as soon
as Pˆ1 receives E1, she applies some measurement (which may depend on θ) to E1 to obtain xˆ1, and
both send xˆ0 and xˆ1 immediately to V0 and V1, respectively. We will argue that the probability
that xˆ0 = x and xˆ1 = x is upper bounded by ε as claimed.
Let |ψAE0E1〉 ∈ HA⊗HE0⊗HE1 be the state of the tri-partite system AE0E1 after Pˆ0 has applied
the quantum operation to the qubit B. Note that in the No-PE model, the quantum operation
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and thus |ψAE0E1〉 does not depend on θ.4 Recall that x is obtained by measuring A in either the
computational (if θ = 0) or the Hadamard (if θ = 1) basis. Writing x, θ, etc. as random variables
X, Θ, etc., it follows from CIT (specifically Corollary 2.5) that H(X|ΘE0)+H(X|ΘE1) ≥ 1 . Let Y0
and Y1 denote the classical information obtained by Pˆ0 and Pˆ1 as a result of measuring E0 and E1,
respectively, with bases that may depend on Θ. By the (generalized) Holevo bound Theorem 2.2,
it follows from the above that
H(X|ΘY0) + H(X|ΘY1) ≥ 1 ,
therefore H(X|ΘYi) ≥ 12 for at least one i ∈ {0, 1}. By Fano’s inequality (Theorem 2.3), we can
conclude that the corresponding error probability qi = P [Xˆi 6=X] satisfies h(qi) ≥ 12 . It thus follows
that the failure probability
q = P [Xˆ0 6=X ∨ Xˆ1 6=X] ≥ max {q0, q1} ≥ h−1(1
2
) ,
and the probability of V0 and V1 accepting, P [Xˆ0=X ∧ Xˆ1=X] = 1− q, is indeed upper bounded
by ε as claimed.
It remains to argue that more than two dishonest provers in the No-PE model cannot do any
better. The reasoning is the same as above. Namely, in order to respond in time, the dishonest
provers that are closer to V0 than P must map the qubit A—possibly jointly—into a bipartite state
E0E1 without knowing θ, and jointly keep E0 and send E1 to the dishonest provers that are “on
the other side” of P (i.e., closer to V1). Then, the reply for V0 needs to be computed from E0 and θ
(possibly jointly by the dishonest provers that are closer to V0), and the response for V1 from E1
and θ. Thus, it can be argued as above that the success probability is bounded by ε as claimed.
6.2 Reducing the Soundness Error
In order to obtain a position-verification scheme with a negligible soundness error, we can simply
repeat the 1-round scheme PVεBB84 from Figure 2. Repeating the scheme n times in sequence, where
the verifiers launch the next execution only after the previous one is finished, reduces the soundness
error to εn. Recall that in the No-PE modeL defined in Section 3.1, the adversaries must start
every round without pre-shared entanglement. Therefore, the security of the sequentually repeated
scheme follows immediately from the security of the 1-round scheme.
Corollary 6.2. In the No-PE model, the n-fold sequential repetition of PVεBB84 from Figure 2 is
εn-sound with ε = 1− h−1(12).
In terms of round complexity, a more efficient way of repeating PVεBB84 is by repeating it in par-
allel: V0 sends n BB84 qubits H
θ1 |x1〉, . . . ,Hθn |xn〉 and V1 sends the corresponding bases θ1, . . . , θn
to P so that they all arrive at the same time at P ’s position, and P needs to reply with the correct
list x1, . . . , xn in time. This protocol is obviously more efficient in terms of round complexity and
appears to be the preferred solution. However, we do not have a proof for the security of the parallel
repetition of PVεBB84.
6.3 Position Verification in Higher Dimensions
The scheme PVεBB84 can easily be extended into higher dimensions. The scheme for d dimensions
is a generalization of the scheme PVεBB84 in Figure 2, where the challenges of the verifiers V1, V2,
4We stress that this independency breaks down if Pˆ0 and Pˆ1 may start off with an entangled state, because then
Pˆ1 can act on his part of the entangled state in a θ-dependent way, which makes the overall state dependent of θ.
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. . ., Vd form a sum sharing of the basis θ, i.e., are random θ1, θ2, . . . , θd ∈ {0, 1} such that their
modulo-2 sum equals θ. As specified in Figure 1, the state Hθ|x〉 and the shares θi are sent by the
verifiers to P such that they arrive at P ’s (claimed) position at the same time. P can reconstruct θ
and measure Hθ|x〉 in the correct basis to obtain x′ = x, which he sends to all the verifiers who
check if x′ arrives in time and equals x.
We can argue security by a reduction to the scheme in 1 dimension. For the sake of concreteness,
we consider 3 dimensions. For 3 dimensions, we need a set of (at least) 4 non-coplanar verifiers
V0, . . . , V3, and the prover P needs to be located inside the tetrahedron defined by the positions
of the 4 verifiers. We consider a coalition of dishonest provers Pˆ0, . . . , Pˆℓ at arbitrary positions
but different to P . We may assume that Pˆ0 is closest to V0. It is easy to see that there exists a
verifier Vj such that d(Pˆ0, Vj) > d(P, Vj). Furthermore, we may assume that Vj is not V0 and thus
we assume for concreteness that it is V1. We strengthen the dishonest provers by giving them θ2
and θ3 for free from the beginning. Since, when θ2 and θ3 are given, θ can be computed from θ1
and vice versa, we may assume that V1 actually sends θ as challenge rather than θ1. But now, θ2
and θ3 are just two random bits, independent of θ and x, and are thus of no help to the dishonest
provers and we can safely ignore them.
As Pˆ0 is further away from V1 than P is, Pˆ0 cannot afford to store H
θ|x〉 until he has learned θ.
Indeed, otherwise V1 will not get a reply in time. Therefore, before she learns θ, Pˆ0 needs to apply
a quantum transformation to Hθ|x〉 with a bi-partite output and keep one part of the output, E0,
and send the other part, E1 to Pˆ1. Note that this quantum transformation is independent of θ, as
long as Pˆ0 does not share an entangled state with the other dishonest provers (who might know θ
by now). Then, xˆ0 and xˆ1, the replies that are sent to V0 and V1, respectively, need to be computed
from θ and E0 alone and from θ and E1 alone. It follows from the analysis of the scheme in one
dimension that the probability that both xˆ0 and xˆ1 coincide with x is at most ε = 1− h−1(12 ).
Corollary 6.3. The above generalization of PVεBB84 to d dimensions is ε-sound in the No-PE model
with ε = 1− h−1(12 ).
7 Position-Based Authentication and Key-Exchange
In this section we consider a new primitive: position-based authentication. In contrast to position-
verification, where the goal of the verifiers is to make sure that entity P is at the claimed location
pos, the verifiers want to make sure that a given message m originates from an entity P that is at
the claimed location pos. We stress that it is not sufficient to first execute a position-verification
scheme with P to ensure that P is at position pos and then have P send or confirm m, because
a coalition of dishonest provers may do a man-in-the-middle attack and stay passive during the
execution of the positioning scheme but modify the communicated message m.
Formally, in a position-based authentication scheme the prover takes as input a message m and
the verifiers V0, . . . , Vk take as input a message m
′ and the claimed position pos of P , and we require
the following security properties.
• εc-Completeness: If m = m′, P is honest and at the claimed position pos, and if there is no
(coalition of) dishonest prover(s), then the verifiers jointly accept except with probability εc.
• εs-Soundness: For any pos ∈ Hull(pos0, . . . , posk) and for any coalition of dishonest provers
Pˆ0, . . . , Pˆℓ at locations all different to pos, if m 6= m′, the verifiers jointly reject except with
probability εs.
We build a position-based authentication scheme based on our position-verification scheme. The
idea is to incorporate the message to be authenticated into the replies of the position-verification
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scheme. Our construction is very generic and may also be useful for turning other kinds of identifi-
cation schemes (not necessarily position-based schemes) into corresponding authentication schemes.
Our aim is merely to show the existence of such a scheme; we do not strive for optimization. We
begin by proposing a weak position-based authentication scheme for a 1-bit message m.
7.1 Weak 1-bit authentication scheme
Let PVε be a 1-round position-verification scheme between k + 1 verifiers V0, . . . , Vk and a prover
P . For simplicity, we assume that, like for the scheme PVεBB84 from Section 6, x and x
′
0, . . . , x
′
k are
classical, and Ver accepts if x′i = x for all i, and thus we understand the output of Resp(ch0, . . . , chk)
as a single element x′ (supposed to be x). We require PVε to have perfect completeness and
soundness ε < 1. We let ⊥ be some special symbol. We consider the weak authentication scheme
given in Figure 4 for a 1-bit messagem ∈ {0, 1}. We assume thatm has already been communicated
to the verifiers and thus there is agreement among the verifiers on the message to be authenticated.
The weak authentication scheme works by executing the 1-round position-verification scheme PVε,
but letting P replace his response x′ by ⊥ with probability q, to be specified later.
0. V0 generates (ch0, . . . , chk) and x using Chlg and sends chi and x to Vi for i = 1, . . . , k.
1. Every verifier Vi sends chi to P in such a way that all chis arrive at the same time at P .
2. When the chis arrive, P computes the authentication tag t as follows and sends it back to all the
verifiers.
If m = 1 then t := Resp(ch0, . . . , chk), and if m = 0 then t := ⊥ with probability q and
t := Resp(ch0, . . . , chk) otherwise.
3. If different verifiers have received different values for t, or it didn’t arrive in time, the verifiers
abort.
Otherwise, they jointly accept if t = x or both m = 0 and t = ⊥.
Figure 4: Generic position-based weak authentication scheme wAUTHε for 1-bit message m.
We analyze the success probability of an adversary authenticating a bitm′ ∈ {0, 1}. We consider
the case where there is no honest prover present (we call this an impersonation attack), and the
case where an honest prover is active and authenticates the bit m 6= m′ (we call this a substitution
attack).
The following properties are easy to verify and follow from the security property of PVε.
Lemma 7.1. Let Pˆ be a coalition of dishonest provers not at the claimed position and trying
to authenticate message m′ = 1. In case of an impersonation attack, the verifiers accept with
probability at most ε, and in case of a substitution attack (with m = 0), the verifiers accept with
probability at most δ = (1− q) + qε = 1− q(1− ε) < 1.
On the other hand, Pˆ can obviously authenticate m′ = 0 by means of a substitution attack
with success probability 1; however, informally, Pˆ has bounded success probability in authenticating
message m′ = 0 by means of an impersonation attack unless he uses the tag ⊥. (This fact is used
later to obtain a strong authentication scheme.)
Let us try to extend the above in order to get a strong authentication scheme. Based on
the observation that by performing a substitution attack on wAUTHε, it is easy to substitute the
message bit m = 1 by m′ = 0 but non-trivial to substitute m = 0 by m′ = 1, a first approach
to obtain an authentication scheme with good security might be to apply wAUTHε bit-wise to a
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balanced encoding of the message. Such an encoding should ensure that for any distinct messages
m and m′, there are many positions in which the encoding of m′ is 1 but the encoding of m
is 0. Unfortunately, this is not good enough. The reason is that P and the verifiers are not
necessarily synchronized. For instance, assume we encode m = 0 into c = 010101...01 and m′ = 1
into c′ = 101010...10, and authentication works by doing wAUTHε bit-wise on all the bits of the
encoded message. If Pˆ wants to substitutem = 0 bym′ = 1 then he can simply do the following. He
tries to authenticate the first bit 1 of c′ towards the verifiers by means of an impersonation attack.
If he succeeds, which he can with constant probability, he simply authenticates the remaining bits
01010...10 of c′ by using P , who is happy to authenticate all of the bits of c = 010101...01. Because
of this issue of Pˆ bringing P and the verifiers out of sync, we need to be more careful about the
exact encoding we use.
7.2 Secure Position-Based Authentication Scheme
We specify a special class of codes, which is strong enough for our purpose.
Definition 7.2. Let c ∈ {0, 1}N . A vector e ∈ {−1, 0, 1}2N is called an embedding of c if by
removing all the −1 entries in e we obtain c. Furthermore, for two strings c, c′ ∈ {0, 1}N we say
that c′ λ-dominates c if for all embeddings e and e′ of c and c′ (at least) one of the following holds:
(a) the number of positions i ∈ {1, . . . , 2N} for which e′i = 1 and ei < 1 is at least λ, or (b) there
exist a consecutive sequence of indices I such that the set J = {i ∈ I : e′i > −1} has size |J | ≥ 4λ
and it contains at least λ indices i ∈ J with ei = −1.
For instance, let c = 00...0 11...1 and c′ = 11...1 00...0, where the blocks of 0’s and 1’s are of
length N/2. It is not hard to see that the two codewords N/4-dominate each other. However,
c˜′ = 0101...01 does not dominate c˜ = 1010...10, since c˜′ can be embedded into ‡0101...01‡‡...‡ and
c˜ into 1010...10‡‡...‡, where here and later we use ‡ to represent −1.
Definition 7.3. A code C is λ-dominating, if any two codewords in C λ-dominate each other.
We note that the requirement for λ-dominating codes can be relaxed in various ways to allow
a greater range of codes.
Let wAUTHε be the above weak authentication scheme satisfying Lemma 7.1. In order to
authenticate a message m ∈ {0, 1}µ in a strong way (with λ a security parameter), an encoding c
of m using a λ-dominating code C is bit-wise authenticated by means of wAUTHε, and the verifiers
perform statistics over the number of ⊥s received. The resulting authentication scheme is given in
Figure 5; as for the weak scheme, we assume that the message m has already been communicated.
0. P and the verifiers encode m into a codeword c = (c1, . . . , cN) ∈ C, for a λ-dominating code C.
1. For j = 1, . . . , N , the following is repeated in sequence.
1.1 P authenticates cj by means of wAUTH
ε. Let ti be the corresponding tag received.
1.2 If j > 4λ, the verifiers compute n⊥(j) = | {i ∈ {j − 4λ, . . . , j} : ci = 0 ∧ ti = ⊥} |.
2. If any of the wAUTHε executions fails, or if n⊥(j) > 8qλ for some round j > 4λ, the verifiers
jointly
reject. Otherwise, m is accepted.
Figure 5: A generic position-based authentication scheme AUTH.
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Theorem 7.4. The generic position-based authentication scheme AUTH (Figure 5) is Ne−2qλ-
complete.
Proof. An honest prover which follows the above scheme can fail only if for some round r, n⊥ > 8qλ.
Using the Chernoff bound [Che52], the probability of having n⊥ > 8qλ at a specific round r, is
upper bounded by e−2qλ. Using the union bound for every possible round j, we can bound the
failure probability with Ne−2qλ.
Before we analyze the security of the authentication scheme, let us discuss the possible attacks
on it. We treat Pˆ as a single identity, however Pˆ represents a collaboration of adversaries. Similarly,
we refer the k + 1 verifiers as a single entity, V . We point out that we do not assume that honest
P and V have synchronized clocks. Therefore, we allow Pˆ to arbitrarily schedule and interleave
the N executions of wAUTHε that V performs with the N executions that P performs. The only
restriction on the scheduling is that P and V perform their executions of wAUTHε in the specified
order.
This means that at any point in time during the attack when P has executed wAUTHε for the bits
c1, . . . , cj−1 and V has executed wAUTH
ε for the bits c′1, . . . , c
′
j′−1 and both are momentarily inactive
(at the beginning of the attack: j = j′ = 1), Pˆ can perform one of the following three actions. (1)
Activate V to run wAUTHε on c′j′ but not activate P ; this corresponds to an impersonation attack.
(2) Activate V to run wAUTHε on c′j′ and activate P to run wAUTH
ε on cj; this corresponds to
a substitution attack if cj 6= c′j′ . (3) Activate P to run wAUTHε on cj but not activate V ; this
corresponds to “fast-forwarding” P . We note that Pˆ ’s choice on which action to perform may be
adaptive and depend on what he has seen so far. However, since V and P execute wAUTHε for
each position within c independently, information gathered from previous executions of wAUTHε
does not improve Pˆ ’s success probability to break the next execution.
It is easy to see that any attack with its (adaptive) choices of (1), (2) or (3) leads to embeddings
e and e′ of c and c′, respectively. Indeed, start with empty strings e = e′ = ∅ and update them as
follows. For each of Pˆ ’s rounds, update e by e‡ and e′ by e′c′j′ if Pˆ chooses (1), update e by ecj
and e′ by e′c′j′ if he chooses (2), and update e by ecj and e
′ by e′‡ if he chooses (3). In the end,
complete e and e′ by padding them with sufficiently many ‡s to have them of length 2N . It is clear
that the obtained e and e′ are indeed valid embeddings of c and c′, respectively.
Theorem 7.5. For any ε > 0 and 0 < q < (1 − ε)/8, the generic position-based authentication
scheme AUTH (Figure 5) is 2−Ω(λ)-sound in the No-PE model.
Proof. Let m and m′ 6= m be the messages input by P and the verifiers, respectively, and let c
and c′ be their encodings. Furthermore, let e and e′ be their embeddings, determined (as explained
above) by Pˆ ’s attack. By the condition on the λ-dominating code C we know that one of the two
properties (a) or (b) of Definition 7.2 holds. If (a) holds, the number of positions i ∈ {1, . . . , 2N}
for which e′i = 1 and ei ∈ {−1, 0} is λ. In this case, by construction of the embeddings, in his attack
Pˆ needs to authenticate (using wAUTHε) the bit 1 at least λ times (by means of an impersonation
or a substitution attack). By Lemma 2, the success probability of Pˆ is thus at most δλ, which is
2−Ω(λ). In the case where property (b) holds, there exists a consecutive sequence of indices I such
that the set J = {i ∈ I : e′i > −1} has size |J | ≥ 4λ and contains at least λ indices i ∈ J with
ei = −1. For any such index i ∈ J with ei = −1, Pˆ needs to authenticate (using wAUTHε) the bit
e′i by means of an impersonation attack, while he may use ⊥ for (at most) a 8q-fraction of those
i’s.
However, by the ε-soundness of PVε, if we require ε < 1 − 8q, the probability of Pˆ succeeding
in this attack is exponentially small in λ.
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A possible choice for a dominating code for µ-bit messages is the balanced repetition code Cµℓ-BR,
obtained by applying the code Cℓ-BR = {00..011..1, 11..100..0} ⊂ {0, 1}2ℓ bit-wise.
Lemma 7.6. For any ℓ and µ, the balanced repetition code Cµℓ-BR is ℓ/4-dominating.
Proof. Let c, c′ ∈ {0, 1}2ℓµ be two distinct code words from Cµℓ-BR, and let e and e′ be their respective
embeddings. Note that c is made up of blocks of 0’s and 1’s of length ℓ. Correspondingly, e is
made up of blocks of 0’s and 1’s of length ℓ, with ‡’s inserted at various positions. Let I1, . . . , I2µ
be the index sets that describe these 0 and 1-blocks of e. In other words, they satisfy: Ij < Ij+1
element-wise, |Ij | = ℓ, and {ei : i ∈ Ij} equals {0} or {1}. Furthermore, the sequence of ei’s with
i ∈ I1 ∪ . . . ∪ I2µ equals c, and as such, for any odd j, one of Ij and Ij+1 is a 0-block and one
a 1-block. Let φ : {1, . . . , µ} → {1, . . . , 2µ} be the function such that Iφ(k) is the k-th 1-block in
I1, . . . , I2µ. The corresponding we can do with c
′ and e′, resulting in blocks I ′1, . . . , I
′
2µ and function
φ′. For any j, we define cl(I ′j) to be the smallest ”interval” in {1, . . . , 4µℓ} that contains I ′j .
For 1-blocks Ij and I
′
j′, we say that Ij overlaps with I
′
j′ if |Ij ∩ cl(I ′j′)| ≥ 3ℓ/4. We make the
following case distinction.
Case 1: Iφ(k′) does not overlap with I
′
φ′(k′) for some k
′. If all the indices in Iφ(k′) \ cl(I ′φ′(k′))
are larger than those in cl(I ′
φ′(k′)), then e
′
i = 1 for all i ∈ I ′φ′(1) ∪ . . . ∪ I ′φ′(k′) but ei < 1 for at least
ℓ/4 of these i’s. A similar argument can be used when all these indices are smaller than those in
cl(I ′
φ′(k′)). If neither of the above holds, then e
′
i = 1 for all i ∈ I ′φ′(k′) but ei < 1 for at least ℓ/4 of
these i’s. Hence, property (a) of Definition 7.2 is satisfied (with parameter ℓ/4).
Case 2: Iφ(k) overlaps with I
′
φ′(k) for every k. Since c and c
′ are distinct, and by the structure
of the code, there must exist two subsequent 1-blocks Iφ(k) and Iφ(k+1) such that the number of
0-blocks between Iφ(k) and Iφ(k+1) is strictly smaller than the number of 0-blocks between the
corresponding 1-blocks I ′
φ′(k) and I
′
φ′(k+1). If there is no 0-block between Iφ(k) and Iφ(k+1) and
(at least) one 0-block between I ′
φ′(k) and I
′
φ′(k+1) then by the assumption on the overlap, at least
half of the indices i in the 0-block I ′
φ′(k)+1 satisfy ei = ‡. If there is one 0-block between Iφ(k)
and Iφ(k+1) and two 0-blocks between I
′
φ′(k) and I
′
φ′(k+1) then at least a quarter of the indices
i ∈ I ′
φ′(k)+1 ∪ I ′φ′(k)+2 satisfy ei = ‡. In both (sub)cases, property (b) of Definition 7.2 is satisfied
(with λ = ℓ/4).
Plugging in the concrete secure positioning scheme from Section 6.3, we obtain a secure real-
ization of position-based authentication scheme in Rd, in the No-PE model.
7.3 Position-Based Key Exchange
The goal of a position-based key-exchange scheme is to have the verifiers agree with honest prover
P at location pos on a key K ∈ {0, 1}L, in such a way that no dishonest prover has any (non-
negligible amount of) information on K beyond its bit-length L, as long as he is not located at
pos.5 Formally, we require the following security properties.
• εc-Completeness: If P is honest and at the claimed position pos, and if there is no (coalition
of) dishonest prover(s), then P and V0, . . . , Vk output the same key K of positive length,
except with probability εc.
• εs-Security: For any position pos ∈ Hull(pos0, . . . , posk) and for any coalition Pˆ of dishonest
provers at locations all different to pos, the hybrid state ρKE, consisting of the key K output
5The length L of the key may depend on the course of the scheme. In particular, an adversary may enforce it to
be 0.
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by the verifiers and the collective quantum system of Pˆ at the end of the scheme, satisfies
δ(ρKE , ρK˜⊗ρE) ≤ εs, where K˜ is chosen independently and at random of the same bit-length
as K.
Note that the security properties only ensure that the verifiers can be convinced that Pˆ has no
information on the key they obtain; no such security is guaranteed for P . Indeed, Pˆ can always
honestly execute the scheme with P , acting as verifiers. Also note that the security properties do
not provide any guarantee to the verifiers that P has obtained the same key that was output by
the verifiers, in case of an active attack by Pˆ , but this feature can always be achieved e.g. with the
help of a position-based authentication scheme by having P send an authenticated hash of his key.
A position-based key-exchange scheme can easily be obtained by taking any quantum key-
distribution (QKD) scheme that requires authenticated communication, and do the authentication
by means of a position-based authentication scheme, like the scheme from the previous section.
One subtlety to take care of is that QKD schemes usually require two-way authentication, whereas
position-based authentication only provides authentication from the prover to the verifiers. How-
ever, this problem can easily be resolved as follows. Whenever the QKD scheme instructs V0 (acting
as Alice in the QKD scheme) to send a message m in an authenticated way to P (acting as Bob),
V0 sends m without authentication to P , but in the next step P authenticates the message m
′ he
has received (supposedly m′ = m) toward the verifiers, who abort and output an empty key K in
case the authentication fails.
Using standard BB84 QKD, we obtain a concrete position-based key-exchange scheme. The
security of that scheme follows from the security of the BB84 protocol [LC99, BBB+00, SP00,
May01, BOHL+05, Ren05] and of the position-based authentication scheme.
8 Conclusion and Open Questions
Continuing a very recent line of research [Mal10a, Mal10b, CFG+10, KMS10, Ken10], we have
given a general proof that information-theoretic position-verification quantum schemes are impos-
sible, thereby answering an open question about the security of schemes proposed in [KMS10] to
the negative. On the positive side, we have provided schemes secure under the assumption that
dishonest provers do not use pre-shared entanglement. Our results naturally lead to the question:
How much entanglement is needed in order to break position-verification protocols? Can we show
security in the bounded-quantum-storage model [DFSS05] where adversaries are limited to store,
say, a linear fraction of the communicated qubits?
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A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Lemma 2.1
In this section we prove the following lemma (Lemma 2.1): For any tri-partite state ρABY with
classical Y ,
H(A|BY ) =
∑
y
PY (y)H(ρ
y
AB |B).
We first consider the case of an “empty” B. Y being classical means that ρAY is of the form
ρAY =
∑
y PY (y)ρ
y
A ⊗ |y〉〈y|. Let us write λy1, . . . , λyn for the eigenvalues of ρyA. Note that the
eigenvalues of ρAY are given by PY (y)λ
y
i with y ∈ Y and i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. It follows that
H(ρAY |Y ) = H(ρAY )−H(ρY ) = −tr
(
ρAY log(ρAY )
)
+ tr
(
ρY log(ρY )
)
= −
(∑
y,i
PY (y)λ
y
i log
(
PY (y)λ
y
i
)−
∑
y
PY (y) log
(
PY (y)
))
= −
∑
y
PY (y)
∑
i
λyi log
(
λyi
)
=
∑
y
PY (y)H(ρ
y
A) .
In general, we can conclude that
H(ρABY |BY ) = H(ρABY )−H(ρBY ) =
∑
y
PY (y)H(ρ
y
AB)−
∑
y
PY (y)H(ρ
y
B)
=
∑
y
PY (y)
(
H(ρyAB)−H(ρyB)
)
=
∑
y
PY (y)H(ρ
y
AB |B) ,
which proves the claim.
A.2 Proof of Corollary 2.5
By Lemma 2.1, we can write
H(X|ΘE) + H(X|ΘF ) = 1
2n
∑
θ
H(ρθXE |E) +
1
2n
∑
θ
H(ρθXF |F )
=
1
2n
∑
θ
(
H(ρθXE |E) + H(ρθ¯XF |F )
)
.
Note that ρθXE is obtained by measuring A of |ψAEF 〉 in basis θ (and ignoring F ), and ρθ¯XF
is obtained by measuring A of |ψAEF 〉 in the complementary basis θ¯ (and ignoring E). Hence,
Theorem 2.4 applies and we can conclude that H(ρθXE |E) + H(ρθ¯XF |F ) ≥ n and thus H(X|ΘE) +
H(X|ΘF ) ≥ n.
B Instantaneous Nonlocal Quantum Computation With N Parties
We generalize the above result to any N -party distributed computation, by generalizing Theo-
rem 4.3 to the case of N -parties. We assume that some distinguished user holds the system A
and the information x ∈ X , while for the rest, each user p = 1 . . . N − 1 holds the system Bp and
the classical input yp ∈ Yp. Let us call the user who holds HA Alice, and the rest of the users Up
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with p = 1 . . . N − 1. Denote Hall , HA ⊗ HB1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ HBN−1 . The parties share an arbitrary
and unknown state |ψ〉 ∈ Hall ⊗HE , and a unitary operation U defined on Hall. The unitary U is
determined by x and {yp} out of some fixed family of unitaries.
Theorem B.1. For every family
{
Ux,y1,...,yN−1
}
of unitaries defined on Hall and for every ε > 0,
given sufficiently many pairwise shared EPR pairs, there exist families {Ax}, {B1y1}, . . ., {BN−1yN−1}
of local operations, acting on Alice’s and Up’s respective sides, with the following property. For
any initial state |ψ〉 ∈ Hall ⊗ HE and for every x ∈ X and y1, . . . , yN−1 ∈ Y1 × · · · × YN−1,
the joint execution Ax ⊗B1y1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ BN−1yN−1 transforms the state |ψ〉 into |ϕ′〉 and provides classical
outputs k to Alice and ℓp to Up, such that the following holds except with probability ε. The state |ϕ′〉
coincides with |ϕ〉 = (Ux,y1,...,yN−1 ⊗ I)|ψ〉 up to local qubit-wise operations on systems A and Bp
for p = 1 . . . N − 1, that are determined by k and {ℓp}.
Proof. As in the two-party case, we may assume that Alice holds |ψ〉 and that for each player Up,
dimHBp = 1. Furthermore, we assume that the joint state of A and {Bp} is pure, and thus we may
ignore system E. We prove the theorem by induction on the number of parties. As we have already
proven the above for N = 2 (and the case of N = 1 is trivial), let us assume that the proposition
holds for N = c and show it also holds for N = c+ 1.
1. Alice begins by teleporting the state |ψ〉 to U1 through teleportation channel number x she
shares with U1. Let k◦ ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}n be the outcome of her measurement performed during
the teleportation.
2. For every i = 1 . . . |X |, denote with |ϕi〉 the state at U1’s end of the ith teleportation channel.
Next, for i = 1, . . . , |X |, users U1 to Uc perform the scheme given by the induction assumption6
on the input state |ϕi〉 with respective classical information ((i, y1), y2, y3, . . . , yc), and with
{U iy1,...,yc := Ux=i,y1,...,yc} being the family of unitaries. At the end of the induction step
U1 holds the state |ϕ′i〉 and each of Up obtains a classical output ℓip,7 such that for every i the
state |ϕ′i〉 coincides with (Ux=i,y1,...,yN−1 ⊗ I)|ϕi〉 up to local qubit-wise operations determined
by {ℓip}.
3. For every i, U1 teleports |ϕ′i〉 back to Alice, using teleportation channel number |X |+ i. Let
ℓ◦,i ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}n be the outcome of his measurement performed during the teleportation.
4. Alice specifies the state at her end of teleportation channel number |X |+x to be the state |ϕ′〉.
Clearly, if k◦ = 0 · · · 0 then the parties U1, . . . ,Uc on teleportation channel i = x perform instanta-
neous quantum computation of the the unitary Ux,y1,...,yc on the state |ψ〉, obtaining the state |ϕ′x〉
which coincides with Ux,y1,...,yc |ψ〉 up to some local qubit-wise operations determined by their clas-
sical outputs ℓx1 , . . . , ℓ
x
c , that is, |ϕ′x〉 =Wℓx1 ,...,ℓxcUx,y1,...,yc|ψ〉, where W is a tensor product of Pauli
matrices determined by their classical input. The state |ϕ′〉 obtained by Alice at the |X | + x tele-
portation channel coincides with |ϕ′x〉 up to local qubit-wise operations determined by ℓ◦,x, which
proves the theorem for this case.
On the other hand, assume k◦ 6= 0 · · · 0, then by the induction assumption
|ϕ′〉 = Vℓ◦,xWℓx1 ,...,ℓxcUx,y1,...,ycVk◦ |ψ〉
= Vℓ◦,xWℓx1 ,...,ℓxcUx,y1,...,ycVk◦U
†
x,y1,...,yc
|ϕ〉
6To be more precise, the scheme is performed with the given instance U, reduced to the case of c classical inputs,
by “merging” the first two inputs, i.e., {Uz1,z2,...,zc}z1∈(X×Y1),z2∈Y2,...,zc∈Yc .
7For simplifying notation, we denote by ℓi1 the classical information k
i that U1 obtains when acting as the distin-
guished user in the scheme given by the induction assumption.
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where Vℓ◦,x and Vk◦ are tensor products of Pauli matrices, and Wℓx1 ,...,ℓxc is the local qubit-wise
(Pauli) operations asserted by the induction assumption. Thus, setting |ψ′〉 := |ϕ′〉, x′ := (x, k◦),
y′1 := (y1, ℓ◦, ℓ
x
1) and y
′
p := (yp, ℓ
x
p) for p = 2...c, and letting
U ′x′,y′1,...,y′c
:= Ux,y1,...,ycVk◦U
†
x,y1,...,yc
Wℓx1 ,...,ℓxcVℓ◦,x,
the state |ϕ〉 can be written as |ϕ〉 = U ′
x′,y′1,...,y
′
c
|ψ′〉. Again, we are back to the original problem of
applying a unitary, U ′
x′,y′1,...,y
′
c
, to a state, |ψ′〉, held by Alice, where the unitary depends on classical
information x′ and {y′p}, known by Alice and the users Up, respectively. We complete the proof
by recalling that the success probability per round is constant which depends only on dimHall.
Assuming sufficient number of pairwise shared EPR pairs, re-applying the above procedure suffi-
ciently many times to the resulting new problem instances guarantees that except with arbitrary
small probability, the state |ϕ′〉 will be of the required form at some point.
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